Coping with the tragedy of the commons: Game structure and design of rules

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 239-261

  Faysse, Nicolas ^a  

^a CIRAD   (France)

Author keywords

Common pool resource; Heterogeneity; Non cooperative game theory; Prisoners' Dilemma; Tragedy of the Commons

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; GAME THEORY; HETEROGENEITY; MODEL;

EID: 15844401043     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00246.x     Document Type: Article

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