Budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 347-367

  Dharmapala, Dhammika ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038759245     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1024205130807     Document Type: Review

References (21)

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