Fragmented government effects on fiscal policy: New evidence

Public Choice

Volumn 109, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 221-242

  Volkerink, BjØrn ^a   De Haan, Jakob ^b  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035729665     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013048518308     Document Type: Article

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