Fiscal indulgence in central Europe: Loss of the external anchor?

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 116-135

  Berger, Helge ^a   Kopits, George ^b   Székely, István P ^c  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b Magyar Nemzeti Bank   (Hungary)

^c INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

EU economic and monetary union; Fiscal policy; Game theoretic approach

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; EUROPEAN UNION; FISCAL POLICY; MONETARY UNION; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 33846695752     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00407.x     Document Type: Article

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