Political parties and the size of government in multiparty legislatures: Examining cross-country and panel data evidence

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 699-728

  Mukherjee, Bumba ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Distributive benefits; ENPP; Party competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043208659     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414003254240     Document Type: Article

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