Cooperation, norms, and revolutions: A unified game-theoretical approach

PLoS ONE

Volumn 5, Issue 10, 2010, Pages

  Helbing, Dirk ^a,b,c   Johansson, Anders ^a,d  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (Hungary)

^d UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; CULTURAL FACTOR; GAME; GROUP DYNAMICS; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; POPULATION SIZE; QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL BELIEF; SOCIAL CAPITAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; THEORETICAL MODEL;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; MODELS, THEORETICAL;

EID: 78149447898     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0012530     Document Type: Article

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