Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 171-202

  Blume, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039572407     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0598     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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