Game-theoretical perspectives on the emergence of social norms

Social Norms

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 105-136

  Voss, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

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EID: 85024908055     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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