메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2010, Pages

Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; GAME THEORY;

EID: 77953349655     PISSN: 1553734X     EISSN: 15537358     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (334)

References (59)
  • 1
    • 0014413249 scopus 로고
    • The tragedy of the commons
    • Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243-1248.
    • (1968) Science , vol.162 , pp. 1243-1248
    • Hardin, G.1
  • 2
    • 0037049973 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Altruistic punishment in humans
    • Fehr E, Gächter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137-140.
    • (2002) Nature , vol.415 , pp. 137-140
    • Fehr, E.1    Gächter, S.2
  • 3
    • 0242268535 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The nature of human altruism
    • Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) The nature of human altruism. Nature 425: 785-791.
    • (2003) Nature , vol.425 , pp. 785-791
    • Fehr, E.1    Fischbacher, U.2
  • 5
    • 33646234699 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolution of altruism and punishment: Role of selfish punisher
    • Nakamaru M, Iwasa Y (2006) The evolution of altruism and punishment: Role of selfish punisher. J Theor Biol 240: 475-488.
    • (2006) J Theor Biol , vol.240 , pp. 475-488
    • Nakamaru, M.1    Iwasa, Y.2
  • 6
    • 30344473631 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • When does "economic man" dominate social behavior
    • Camerer CF, Fehr E (2006) When does "economic man" dominate social behavior. Science 311: 47-52.
    • (2006) Science , vol.311 , pp. 47-52
    • Camerer, C.F.1    Fehr, E.2
  • 7
    • 33645679620 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions
    • Gurerk O, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B (2006) The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312: 108-111.
    • (2006) Science , vol.312 , pp. 108-111
    • Gurerk, O.1    Irlenbusch, B.2    Rockenbach, B.3
  • 9
    • 0035819418 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why people punish defectors
    • Henrich J, Boyd R (2001) Why people punish defectors. J Theor Biol 208: 79-89.
    • (2001) J Theor Biol , vol.208 , pp. 79-89
    • Henrich, J.1    Boyd, R.2
  • 11
    • 0038191147 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Punishing and reputation in spatial public goods games
    • Brandt H, Hauert C, Sigmund K (2003) Punishing and reputation in spatial public goods games. Proc R Soc Lond Ser B 270: 1099-1104.
    • (2003) Proc R Soc Lond Ser B , vol.270 , pp. 1099-1104
    • Brandt, H.1    Hauert, C.2    Sigmund, K.3
  • 13
    • 16544383201 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Don't lose your reputation
    • Fehr E (2004) Don't lose your reputation. Nature 432: 449-450.
    • (2004) Nature , vol.432 , pp. 449-450
    • Fehr, E.1
  • 14
    • 34249676346 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The puzzle of cooperation
    • Colman AM (2006) The puzzle of cooperation. Nature 440: 744-745.
    • (2006) Nature , vol.440 , pp. 744-745
    • Colman, A.M.1
  • 15
    • 25644437118 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Second-order free-riding problem solved?
    • Fowler JH (2005) Second-order free-riding problem solved? Nature 437: E8-E8.
    • (2005) Nature , vol.437
    • Fowler, J.H.1
  • 17
    • 9644289531 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
    • Panchanathan K, Boyd R (2004) Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432: 499-502.
    • (2004) Nature , vol.432 , pp. 499-502
    • Panchanathan, K.1    Boyd, R.2
  • 18
    • 0037165214 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reputation helps to solve the "tragedy of the commons"
    • Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck H-J (2002) Reputation helps to solve the "tragedy of the commons". Nature 415: 424-426.
    • (2002) Nature , vol.415 , pp. 424-426
    • Milinski, M.1    Semmann, D.2    Krambeck, H.-J.3
  • 19
    • 18744400528 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation
    • Fowler JH (2005) Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 102: 7047-7049.
    • (2005) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA , vol.102 , pp. 7047-7049
    • Fowler, J.H.1
  • 21
    • 34347372907 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment
    • Hauert C, Traulsen A, Brandt H, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2007) Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment. Science 316: 1905-1907.
    • (2007) Science , vol.316 , pp. 1905-1907
    • Hauert, C.1    Traulsen, A.2    Brandt, H.3    Nowak, M.A.4    Sigmund, K.5
  • 22
    • 0037052461 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods game
    • Hauert C, De Monte S, Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (2002) Volunteering as red queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods game. Science 296: 1129-1132.
    • (2002) Science , vol.296 , pp. 1129-1132
    • Hauert, C.1    de Monte, S.2    Hofbauer, J.3    Sigmund, K.4
  • 23
    • 0141732289 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Volunteering leads to rockpaper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game
    • Semmann D, Krambeck H-J, Milinski M (2003) Volunteering leads to rockpaper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game. Nature 425: 390-393.
    • (2003) Nature , vol.425 , pp. 390-393
    • Semmann, D.1    Krambeck, H.-J.2    Milinski, M.3
  • 26
    • 0029837509 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action
    • Heckathorn DD (1996) The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. American Sociological Review 61: 250-277.
    • (1996) American Sociological Review , vol.61 , pp. 250-277
    • Heckathorn, D.D.1
  • 27
  • 28
    • 26444470523 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in the lattice structured population: Score-dependent viability versus scoredependent fertility
    • Nakamaru M, Iwasa Y (2005) The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in the lattice structured population: Score-dependent viability versus scoredependent fertility. Evolutionary Ecology Research 7: 853-870.
    • (2005) Evolutionary Ecology Research , vol.7 , pp. 853-870
    • Nakamaru, M.1    Iwasa, Y.2
  • 29
    • 57749201150 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games
    • Sekiguchi T, Nakamaru M (2009) Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games. Journal of Theoretical Biology 256(2): 297-304.
    • (2009) Journal of Theoretical Biology , vol.256 , Issue.2 , pp. 297-304
    • Sekiguchi, T.1    Nakamaru, M.2
  • 30
    • 33845415805 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Five rules for the evolution of cooperation
    • Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314: 1560-1563.
    • (2006) Science , vol.314 , pp. 1560-1563
    • Nowak, M.A.1
  • 31
    • 77649261046 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
    • Traulsen A, et al. (2010) Human strategy updating in evolutionary games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107: 2962-2966.
    • (2010) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA , vol.107 , pp. 2962-2966
    • Traulsen, A.1
  • 32
    • 75449114445 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
    • Nowak MA, Tarnita CE, Antal T (2010) Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations. Phil Trans R Soc B 365: 19-30.
    • (2010) Phil Trans R Soc B , vol.365 , pp. 19-30
    • Nowak, M.A.1    Tarnita, C.E.2    Antal, T.3
  • 34
    • 32144443364 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Driving forces behind informal sanctions
    • Falk A, Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2005) Driving forces behind informal sanctions. Econometrica 73: 2017-2030.
    • (2005) Econometrica , vol.73 , pp. 2017-2030
    • Falk, A.1    Fehr, E.2    Fischbacher, U.3
  • 35
    • 23744457896 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • False friends are worse than bitter enemies: "Altruistic" punishment of in-group members
    • Shinada M, Yamagishi T, Ohmura Y (2004) False friends are worse than bitter enemies: "Altruistic" punishment of in-group members. Evol Hum Behav 25: 379-393.
    • (2004) Evol Hum Behav , vol.25 , pp. 379-393
    • Shinada, M.1    Yamagishi, T.2    Ohmura, Y.3
  • 36
    • 45849156108 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games
    • Szabó G, Hauert C (2002) Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games. Phys Rev Lett 89: 118101.
    • (2002) Phys Rev Lett , vol.89 , pp. 118101
    • Szabó, G.1    Hauert, C.2
  • 37
    • 47049124531 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games
    • Santos FC, Santos MD, Pacheco JM (2008) Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454: 213-216.
    • (2008) Nature , vol.454 , pp. 213-216
    • Santos, F.C.1    Santos, M.D.2    Pacheco, J.M.3
  • 39
    • 0026613691 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
    • Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359: 826-829.
    • (1992) Nature , vol.359 , pp. 826-829
    • Nowak, M.A.1    May, R.M.2
  • 43
  • 44
    • 74549144963 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Population structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperation
    • Pacheco JM, Pinheiro FL, Santos FC (2009) Population structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperation. PLoS Comput Biol 5: e1000596.
    • (2009) PLoS Comput Biol , vol.5
    • Pacheco, J.M.1    Pinheiro, F.L.2    Santos, F.C.3
  • 45
    • 0002180201 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice
    • Szabó G, Töke C (1998) Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice. Phys Rev E 58: 69-73.
    • (1998) Phys Rev E , vol.58 , pp. 69-73
    • Szabó, G.1    Töke, C.2
  • 46
    • 0035939436 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Critical coarsening without surface tension: The universality class of the voter model
    • Dornic I, Chaté H, Chave J, Hinrichsen H (2001) Critical coarsening without surface tension: The universality class of the voter model. Phys Rev Lett 87: 045701.
    • (2001) Phys Rev Lett , vol.87 , pp. 045701
    • Dornic, I.1    Chaté, H.2    Chave, J.3    Hinrichsen, H.4
  • 47
    • 0242436716 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Do irregular grids make a difference? Relaxing the spatial regularity assumption in cellular models of social dynamics
    • see
    • Flache A, Hegselmann R (2001) Do irregular grids make a difference? Relaxing the spatial regularity assumption in cellular models of social dynamics. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 4: 4. see http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS/4/4/6.html.
    • (2001) Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation , vol.4 , pp. 4
    • Flache, A.1    Hegselmann, R.2
  • 49
    • 62649155153 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions
    • Helbing D, Yu W (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106: 3680-3685.
    • (2009) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA , vol.106 , pp. 3680-3685
    • Helbing, D.1    Yu, W.2
  • 51
    • 77955365776 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Defector-accelerated cooperativeness in public goods games with punishment and mutations
    • in preparation
    • Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabó G Defector-accelerated cooperativeness in public goods games with punishment and mutations, in preparation.
    • Helbing, D.1    Szolnoki, A.2    Perc, M.3    Szabó, G.4
  • 52
    • 40449124143 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Antisocial punishment across societies
    • Herrmann B, Thöni C, Gächter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319: 1362-1367.
    • (2008) Science , vol.319 , pp. 1362-1367
    • Herrmann, B.1    Thöni, C.2    Gächter, S.3
  • 53
    • 56949091213 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tag prevails
    • Rand DG, Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA (2009) Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tag prevails. J Theor Biol 256: 45-57.
    • (2009) J Theor Biol , vol.256 , pp. 45-57
    • Rand, D.G.1    Ohtsuki, H.2    Nowak, M.A.3
  • 54
    • 70349496944 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games
    • Szabó G, Szolnoki A, Jeromos V (2009) Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games. EPL 87: 18007.
    • (2009) EPL , vol.87 , pp. 18007
    • Szabó, G.1    Szolnoki, A.2    Jeromos, V.3
  • 55
    • 33750440513 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties
    • Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T (2006) Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties. PLoS Comput Biol 2: 1284-1291.
    • (2006) PLoS Comput Biol , vol.2 , pp. 1284-1291
    • Santos, F.C.1    Pacheco, J.M.2    Lenaerts, T.3
  • 56
    • 73449112588 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Coevolutionary games - A mini review
    • Perc M, Szolnoki A (2010) Coevolutionary games - A mini review. BioSystems 99: 109-125.
    • (2010) BioSystems , vol.99 , pp. 109-125
    • Perc, M.1    Szolnoki, A.2
  • 57
    • 0347694648 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in heterogeneous populations
    • Bowles S, Gintis H (2004) The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theor Popul Biol 65: 17-28.
    • (2004) Theor Popul Biol , vol.65 , pp. 17-28
    • Bowles, S.1    Gintis, H.2
  • 58
    • 77955399797 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Spreading of costly punishment and evolutionary resonance in the spatial public goods game
    • in preparation
    • Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabó G Spreading of costly punishment and evolutionary resonance in the spatial public goods game, in preparation.
    • Helbing, D.1    Szolnoki, A.2    Perc, M.3    Szabó, G.4
  • 59
    • 1342268335 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rock-scissors-paper game on regular smallworld networks
    • Szabó G, Szolnoki A, Izsák R (2004) Rock-scissors-paper game on regular smallworld networks. J Phys A: Math Gen 37: 2599-2609.
    • (2004) J Phys A: Math Gen , vol.37 , pp. 2599-2609
    • Szabó, G.1    Szolnoki, A.2    Izsák, R.3


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.