Variable-Frame Level-n Theory

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 220-246

  Bacharach, Michael ^a   Stahl, Dale O ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346482313     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0796     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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