Collective action and the evolution of social norms

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 137-158

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000769811     PISSN: 08953309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jep.14.3.137     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. Acheson, James M. 1988. The Lobster Gangs of Maine. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
2. Agrawal, Arun. 1999. Greener Pastures: Politics, Markets, and Community among a Migrant Pastoral People. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
3. Ahn, Toh-Kyeong, Elinor Ostrom, David Schmidt and James Walker. 1999. "Dilemma Games: Game Parameters and Matching Protocols." Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working paper.
4. Ahn, Toh-Kyeong, Elinor Ostrom and James Walker. 1998. "Trust and Reciprocity: Experimental Evidence from PD Games." Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working paper.
5. Asquith, Nigel M. 1999. How Should the World Bank Encourage Private Sector Investment in Biodiversity Conservation? A Report Prepared for Kathy MacKinnon, Biodiversity Specialist, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Durham, North Carolina: Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University.
6. Axelrod, Robert. 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." American Political Science Review. December 80:4, pp. 1095-1111.
7. Baland, Jean-Marie and Jean-Philippe Platteau. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8. Bardhan, Pranab. 1999. "Water Community: An Empirical Analysis of Cooperation on Irrigation in South India." Berkeley: University of California, Department of Economics, Working paper.
9. Barkow, Jerome H., Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, eds. 1992. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Bates, Robert H. 1987. Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
11. Berkes, Fikret. 1987. "Common Property Resource Management and Cree Indian Fisheries in Subarctic Canada," in The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Bonnie J. McCay and James Acheson, eds. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, pp. 66-91.
12. Blomquist, William. 1992. Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
13. Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey. 1999. "The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. January, 38:1, pp. 43-58.
14. Bonnet, Iris, Bruno S. Frey and Steffen Huck. 1999. "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Working paper.
15. Börgers, Tilman and Rajiv Sarin. 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics." Journal of Economic Theory. 77, pp. 1-14.
16. Bowles, Samuel. 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions." Journal of Economic Literature. March, 36, pp. 75-111.
17. Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
18. Britt, Charla. 2000. "Forestry and Forest Policies." Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working paper.
19. Bromley, Daniel W. et al., eds. 1992. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
20. Cain, Michael. 1998. "An Experimental Investigation of Motives and Information in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game." Advances in Group Pro-cesses. 15, pp. 135-60.
21. Cameron, Lisa. 1995. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia." Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, Discussion paper.
22. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, John K. Stranlund and Cleve E. Willis. 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out." World Development. Autumn, forthcoming.
23. Chong, Dennis. 1991. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
24. Clark, Andy and Annette Karmiloff-Smith. 1991. "The Cognizer's Innards: A Psychological and Philosophical Perspective on the Development of Thought." Mind and Language. Winter, 8:4, pp. 487-519.
25. Crawford, Sue E. S. and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. "A Grammar of Institutions." American Political Science Review. September, 89:3, pp. 582-600.
26. Cummins, Denise D. 1996. "Evidence of Deontic Reasoning in 3-and 4-Year-Olds." Memory and Cognition. 24, pp. 823-29.
27. Davis, Douglas D. and Charles A. Holt. 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
28. Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish and Harriet Shaklee. 1977. "Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions about Other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 35:1, pp. 1-11.
29. Epstein, Joshua M. and Robert Axtell. 1996. Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
30. Eshel, Ilan, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked. 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model." American Economic Review. March, 88:1, pp. 157-79.
31. Feeny, David, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J. McCay and James M. Acheson. 1990. "The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later." Human Ecology. 18:1, pp. 1-19.
32. Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter. Forthcoming. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments." American Economic Review. 90:1.
33. Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt. 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114:3, pp. 817-68.
34. Frank, Robert H., Thomas Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan. 1993. "The Evolution of One-Shot Cooperation: An Experiment." Ethology and Sociobiology. July, 14, pp. 247-56.
35. Frey, Bruno S. 1994. "How Intrinsic Motivation is Crowded Out and In." Rationality and Society. 6, pp. 334-52.
36. Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1996. "Experiencing Impartiality to Invoke Fairness in the N-PD: Some Experimental Results." Public Choice. 86, pp. 117-35.
37. Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Oran Young. 1971. Political Leadership and Collective Goods. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38. Ghate, Rucha. 2000. "The Role of Autonomy in Self-Organizing Process: A Case Study of Local Forest Management in India." Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working paper.
39. Güth, Werner. 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives." International Journal of Game Theory. 24, pp. 323-44.
40. Güth, Werner and Hartmut Kliemt. 1998. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach: Bridging the Gap between Rationality and Adaptation." Rationality and Society. August, 10:3, pp. 377-99.
41. Güth, Werner and Menahem Yaari. 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in a Simple Strategic Game," in Explaining Process and Change. Approaches to Evolutionary Economics. Ulrich Witt, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 23-34.
42. Hardin, Russell. 1971. "Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma." Science. September-October, 16, pp. 472-81.
43. Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
44. Hess, Charlotte. 1999. A Comprehensive Bibliography of Common Pool Resources. CD-ROM. Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.
45. Isaac, R. Mark, James Walker and Arlington W. Williams. 1994. "Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups." Journal of Public Economics. May, 54:1, pp. 1-36.
46. Johnson, Ronald N. and Gary D. Libecap. 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery." American Economic Review. December, 27:5, pp. 1005-1023.
47. Kagel, John and Alvin Roth, eds. 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
48. Kikuchi, Masao, Yoriko Watanabe and Toshio Yamagishi. 1996. "Accuracy in the Prediction of Others' Trustworthiness and General Trust: An Experimental Study." Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 37:1, pp. 23-36.
49. Kikuchi, Masao, Masako Fujita, Esther Marciano and Yujiro Hayami. 1998. "State and Community in the Deterioration of a National Irrigation System." Paper presented at the World Bank-EDI Conference on "Norms and Evolution in the Grassroots of Asia," Stanford University, February 6-7.
50. Kreps, David M., Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson. 1982. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Economic Theory. 27, pp. 245-52.
51. Lam, Wai Fung. 1998. Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and Collective Action. Oakland, CA: ICS Press.
52. Ledyard, John. 1995. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," in The Handbook of Experimental Economics. John Kagel and Alvin Roth, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 111-94.
53. Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
54. Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1996. The Cooperator's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
55. Manktelow, Ken I. and David E. Over. 1991. "Social Roles and Utilities in Reasoning with Deontic Conditionals." Cognition. 39, pp. 85-105.
56. McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith. 1996. "Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. November, 93, 13,421-13,428.
57. McCabe, Kevin A. and Vernon L. Smith. 1999. "Strategic Analysis by Players in Games: What Information Do They Use." Tucson: University of Arizona, Economic Research Laboratory, Working paper.
58. Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." Economics and Politics. March, 2:1, pp. 1-23.
59. Montgomery, Michael R. and Richard Bean. 1999. "Market Failure, Government Failure, and the Private Supply of Public Goods: The Case of Climate-Controlled Walkway Networks." Public Choice. June, 99:3/4, pp. 403-37.
60. Morrow, Christopher E. and Rebecca Watts Hull. 1996. "Donor-Initiated Common Pool Resource Institutions: The Case of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative." World Development. 24:10, pp. 1641-1657.
61. Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund. 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring." Nature. 393:6685, pp. 573-77.
62. Oaksford, Mike and Nick Chater. 1994. "A Rational Analysis of the Selection Task as Optimal Data Selection." Psychological Review. 101:4, pp. 608-31.
63. Offerman, Theo. 1997. Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Goods Games: Theory and Experiments. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
64. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
65. Opp, Karl-Dieter, Peter Voss and Christiana Gern. 1995. Origins of Spontaneous Revolution. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
66. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
67. Ostrom, Elinor. 1998a. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Review. March, 92:1, pp. 1-22.
68. Ostrom, Elinor. 1998b. "Institutional Analysis, Design Principles, and Threats to Sustainable Community Governance and Management of Commons," in Law and the Governance of Renewable Resources: Studies from Northern Europe and Africa. Erling Berge and Nils Christian Stenseth, eds. Oakland, CA: ICS Press, pp. 27-53.
69. Ostrom, Elinor. Forthcoming. "Reformulating the Commons," in The Commons Revisited: An Americas Perspective. Joanna Burger, Richard Norgaard, Elinor Ostrom, David Policansky, and Bernard Goldstein, eds. Washington, DC: Island Press.
70. Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
71. Ostrom, Elinor and James Walker. 1997. "Neither Markets Nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas," in Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Dennis C. Mueller, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 35-72.
72. Pinker, Steven. 1994. The Language Instinct. New York: W. Morrow.
73. Posner, Richard A. and Eric B. Rasmusen. 1999. "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions." International Review of Law and Economics. September, 19:3, pp. 369-82.
74. Rabin, Matthew. 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics." American Economic Review. 83, pp. 1281-1302.
75. Ray, Ishar and Jeffrey Williams. 1999. "Evaluation of Price Policy in the Presence of Water Theft." American Journal of Agricultural Economics. November, 81, pp. 928-41.
76. Schlager, Edella. 1994. "Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas," in Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 247-65.
77. Selten, Reinhard. 1991. "Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior." Games and Economic Behavior. February, 3:1, pp. 3-24.
78. Sengupta, Nirmal. 1991. Managing Common Property: Irrigation in India and the Philippines. New Delhi: Sage.
79. Sethi, Rajiv and Eswaran Somanathan. 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use." American Economic Review. September, 86:4, pp. 766-88.
80. Tang, Shui Yan. 1992. Institutions and Collective Action: Self Governance in Irrigation. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
81. Trawick, Paul. 1999. "The Moral Economy of Water: 'Comedy' and 'Tragedy' in the Andean Commons." Lexington: University of Kentucky, Department of Anthropology, Working paper.
82. Varughese, George. 1999. "Villagers, Bureaucrats, and Forests in Nepal: Designing Governance for a Complex Resource." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University.
83. Wade, Robert. 1994. Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
84. Yoder, Robert D. 1992. Performance of the Chhattis Mauja Irrigation System, a Thirty-five Hundred Hectare System Built find Managed by Farmers, in Nepal. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute.