Evolutionary games on graphs

Physics Reports

Volumn 446, Issue 4-6, 2007, Pages 97-216

  Szabó, György ^a   Fáth, Gábor ^b  

^a RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TECHNICAL PHYSICS AND MATERIALS SCIENCE   (Hungary)

^b WIGNER RESEARCH CENTRE FOR PHYSICS   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Evolution; Game theory; Graphs; Networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250617077     PISSN: 03701573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004     Document Type: Review

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