Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Bulletin of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 66, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 1621-1644

  Taylor, Christine ^a   Fudenberg, Drew ^b   Sasaki, Akira ^c   Nowak, Martin A ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; EVOLUTION; GAME; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; STATISTICS;

EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 7444261396     PISSN: 00928240     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004     Document Type: Article

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