Communication and collective action: Language and the evolution of human cooperation

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 231-245

  Smith, Eric Alden ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Language; Large scale cooperation; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

PRIMATES;

EID: 77953709251     PISSN: 10905138     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.03.001     Document Type: Review

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