Social dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation

Annual Review of Sociology

Volumn 24, Issue , 1998, Pages 182-214

  Kollock, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Commons; Prisoner's dilemma; Public good

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542710569     PISSN: 03600572     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183     Document Type: Article

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