Game theory evolving: A problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction second edition

Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction Second Edition

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Gintis, Herbert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84883928352     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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