Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 215, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 287-296

  Boyd, Robert ^a   Richerson, Peter J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POPULATION STRUCTURE;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GROUP DYNAMICS; HUMAN; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; POPULATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIETY;

EID: 0036350039     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515     Document Type: Article

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