Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics

Physics of Life Reviews

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 208-249

  Roca, Carlos P ^a   Cuesta, José A ^a   Sánchez, Angel ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZARAGOZA   (Spain)

^c INSTITUTO DE CIENCIAS MATEMÁTICAS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Emergence of cooperation; Evolutionary games; Fluctuations; Mean field; Network reciprocity; Replicator dynamics; Spatial structure

Indexed keywords

EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; FLUCTUATIONS; MEAN-FIELD; NETWORK RECIPROCITY; REPLICATOR DYNAMICS; SPATIAL STRUCTURE;

BIOLOGY; DYNAMICS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 70350566803     PISSN: 15710645     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2009.08.001     Document Type: Review

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