Evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 200, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 405-417

  Brauchli, Kurt ^a   Killingback, Timothy ^a   Doebeli, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRISONER DILEMMA; SPATIAL VARIATION;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; MODEL; POPULATION GENETICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

EID: 0033592628     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.1999.1000     Document Type: Article

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