Empathy leads to fairness

Bulletin of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 64, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 1101-1116

  Page, Karen M ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036852461     PISSN: 00928240     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/bulm.2002.0321     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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