How noise matters

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 251-271

  Blume, Lawrence E ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041657474     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00554-7     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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15. Kingman, J.F.C., 1993. Poisson Processes. Oxford Univ. Press, New York.
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