Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 250, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 723-731

  Pacheco, Jorge M ^a   Traulsen, Arne ^b   Ohtsuki, Hisashi ^b   Nowak, Martin A ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LISBON   (Portugal)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coevolution; Dynamically structured populations; Evolutionary game theory; Structured populations

Indexed keywords

COEVOLUTION; DOMINANCE; DYNAMIC PROPERTY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; GRAPHICAL METHOD; INDIVIDUAL VARIATION; POPULATION STRUCTURE; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; COEVOLUTION; COOPERATION; GAME; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PRODUCTIVITY; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

EID: 38649137995     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.040     Document Type: Article

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