Economics and the theory of games

Economics and the Theory of Games

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-512

  Vega Redondo, Fernando ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925135639     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511753954     Document Type: Book

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