A generalized adaptive dynamics framework can describe the evolutionary Ultimatum Game

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 209, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 173-179

  Page, Karen M ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADAPTATION; ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; MUTANT; PARAMETER; POPULATION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

EID: 0035925394     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2251     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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10. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
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12. Adaptive dynamics: A geometrical study of the consequences of nearly faithful reproduction
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16. Bargaining experiments
17. Bargaining and market power in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo
18. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
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