Altruism may arise from individual selection

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 235, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 233-240

  Sánchez, Angel ^a   Cuesta, José A ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Behavioral evolution; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary theories; Individual selection; Strong reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; RECIPROCITY; SELECTION;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; CORRELATION ANALYSIS; EVOLUTION; GAME; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL EVOLUTION;

EID: 18044370639     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.01.006     Document Type: Article

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