Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 257, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 689-695

  Woelfing, Benno ^a   Traulsen, Arne ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Deterministic versus stochastic payoffs; Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Frequency dependent selection; Payoff assignment

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; SAMPLING; STOCHASTICITY;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE; COPING BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY; GAME; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; STOCHASTIC MODEL;

ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SELECTION, GENETIC; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 62549161280     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.025     Document Type: Article

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