Crime and punishment and corruption: Who needs "untouchables?"

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 69-87

  Silva, Emilson C D ^a   Kahn, Charles M ^b,d   Xie, Zhu ^c,e  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c OAKLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^e OAKLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247224299     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00298.x     Document Type: Article

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