Organized crime, corruption and punishment

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 9-10, 2005, Pages 1639-1663

  Kugler, Maurice ^a   Verdier, Thierry ^b,c   Zenou, Yves ^a,d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

^e UNIVERSITÉ DU MAINE   (France)

Author keywords

Corruption; Deterrence; Free entry; Oligopoly; Organized crime

Indexed keywords

EID: 23244448952     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005     Document Type: Article

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