Collusion and renegotiation in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 497-518

  Strausz, Roland ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031326179     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00078     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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13. Strausz, R.: Collusion and renegotation in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship. DP 9548, CentER, Tilburg University, 1995.
14. Tirole, J.: Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181-214, 1986a.
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16. Tirole, J.: Collusion and the theory of organizations. In J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory, 6th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. II, Cambridge, 151-206, 1992.