A theory of bureaucratization based on reciprocity and collusive behavior

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 555-579

  Martimort, David ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041049069     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00081     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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