Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 35-51

  Chang, Juin Jen ^c   Lai, Ching Chong ^a   Yang, C C ^b  

^a ACADEMIA SINICA   (Taiwan)

^b INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS   (Taiwan)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Casual corruption; Crime; Enforcement; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041702735     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00020-X     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Akerlof G.A. A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence. Q J Econ. 94:1980;749-775.
2. Bardhan P. Corruption and development a review of issues . J Econ Lit. 35:1997;1320-1346.
3. Becker G.S. Crime and punishment an economic approach . J Polit Econ. 76:1968;169-217.
4. Benson B.L. Corruption in law enforcement one consequence of "the tragedy of the commons" arising with public allocation processes . Int Rev Law Econ. 8:1988;73-84.
5. Bowles R., Garoupa N. Casual police corruption and the economics of crime. Int Rev Law Econ. 17:1997;75-87.
6. Campbell D.T. Legal and primary-group social controls. J Soc Biol Structures. 5:1982;431-438.
7. Chatterjee K., Samuelson W. Bargaining under incomplete information. Op Res. 31:1983;835-851.
8. Chu C.Y.C. A model of income tax evasion with venal tax officials - the case of Taiwan. Pub Finance/Fin Publiques. 45:1990;392-408.
9. Cullis J.G., Lewis A. Why people pay taxes from a conventional economic model to a model of social convention . J Econ Psychol. 18:1997;305-321.
10. Elster J. Social norms and economic theory. J Econ Perspectives. 3:1989;99-117.
11. Geanakoplos J., Pearce D., Stacchetti E. Psychological games and sequential rationality. J Games Econ Behav. 1:1989;60-79.
12. Hollander H. A social exchange approach to voluntary cooperation. Am Econ Rev. 80:1990;1157-1167.
13. Huang P.H., Wu H.M. More order without more law a theory of social norms and organizational cultures . J Law Econ Organization. 10:1994;390-406.
14. Marjit S., Shi H. On controlling crime with corrupt officials. J Econ Behav Organization. 34:1998;163-172.
15. Myerson R., Satterthwaite M. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J Econ Theory. 28:1983;265-281.
16. Naylor R. Strikes, free riders, and social custom. Q J Econ. 104:1989;771-785.
17. Naylor R. A social custom model of collective action. Eur J Polit Econ. 6:1990;201-216.
18. Policy Group. (1985). Estimates of tax collection and evasion in respect to the 1985-86 budget. Mimeo, New Delhi.
19. Polinsky A.M., Shavell S. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment. J Public Econ. 24:1984;89-99.
20. Polinsky A.M., Shavell S. On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence. J Legal Studies. 28:1999;1-16.
21. Posner R.A. The Economic Theory of Justice. 1983;Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
22. Posner R.A. Social norms and the law an economic approach . AEA Papers Proc. 87:1997;365-369.
23. Tajfel H. Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annu Rev Psychol. 33:1982;1-39.