Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 8, 2002, Pages

  Vafaï, Kouroche ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^b CIRANO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Abuse of authority; Collusion; Hierarchy; Moral hazard; Simple contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036823774     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(02)00003-6     Document Type: Article

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