On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 280-291

  Kessler, Anke S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344363288     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2617     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Baron D., Besanko D. Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing. RAND J. Econ. 15:1984;447-470.
2. Baron D., Myerson R. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica. 50:1982;911-930.
3. Kofman F., Lawarrée J. Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica. 61:1993;629-656.
4. Laffont J. J., Tirole J. Using cost observations to regulate firms. J. Polit. Econ. 94:1986;614-641.
5. Laffont J. J., Tirole J. The politics of government decision making: regulatory institutions. J. Law Econ. Organ. 6:1990;1-32.
6. Laffont J. J., Tirole J. The politics of government decision making: a theory of regulatory capture. Quart. J. Econ. 106:1991;1089-1127.
7. Laffont J. J., Tirole J. Cost padding, auditing and collusion. Ann. Écon. Statist. 1992;205-226.
8. Melumad N. D., Mookherjee D. Delegation as commitment: The case of income tax audits. RAND J. Econ. 20:1989;139-163.
9. Melumad N. D., Mookherjee D., Reichelstein S. Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts. RAND J. Econ. 26:1995;654-672.
10. Nalebuff B., Scharfstein D. Testing in models of adverse selection. Rev. Econ. Stud. 54:1987;265-277.
11. Tirole J. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. J. Law Econ. Organ. 2:1986;181-214.
12. Tirole J. Collusion and the theory of organizations. Laffont J. J. Advances in Economic Theory: Proceedings of the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society. 1992;Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.