Collusion-proof yardstick competition

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 231-254

  Tangerås, Thomas P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

Collusion; Collusion proofness; Regulation; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036182114     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00173-0     Document Type: Article

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