The life cycle of regulatory agencies: Dynamic capture and transaction costs

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 929-947

  Martimort, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE PAU ET DES PAYS DE L'ADOUR   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013431111     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00114     Document Type: Article

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