Collusion-proof samuelson conditions for public goods

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 399-438

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a   Martimort, David ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE PAU ET DES PAYS DE L'ADOUR   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 15844408769     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00019     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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