Informational alliances

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 743-768

  Baron, David P ^a   Besanko, David ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013178843     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00107     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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