On the optimality of allowing collusion

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 383-407

  Kofman, Fred ^a,d   Lawarrée, Jacques ^b,c  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^c ECARES   (Belgium)

^d Leading Learning Communities   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Auditing; Collusion; Corruption; Hierarchies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030240724     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01532-9     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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