Collusion under asymmetric information

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 875-911

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a   Martimort, David ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Collusion; Mechanism design; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000287595     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171943     Document Type: Article

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