Collusion, delegation and supervision with soft information

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 253-279

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^b   Martimort, David ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE;

EID: 0038660471     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.000244     Document Type: Article

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