Organizational formation and change: Lessons from economic laboratory experiments

Handbook of Economic Organization: Integrating Economic and Organization Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 245-270

  Kriss, Peter H ^a   Weber, Roberto ^b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85032616923     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781782548225.00023     Document Type: Chapter

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