Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 94, Issue 7-8, 2010, Pages 515-522

  Gächter, Simon ^a,b,c   Nosenzo, Daniele ^a   Renner, Elke ^a   Sefton, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b IZA ^*  (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experiment; Public goods; Sequential moves; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953723510     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.03.002     Document Type: Article

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