Nonmonetary sanctions and rewards in an experimental coordination game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 377-386

  Dugar, Subhasish ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coordination games; Experiment; Nonmonetary sanction; Reward

Indexed keywords

EID: 77349114668     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.003     Document Type: Article

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