Authority and communication in the laboratory

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 541-560

  Lai, Ernest K ^a   Lim, Wooyoung ^b  

^a LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Cheap talk communication; Decision making authority; Delegation; Laboratory experiment; Level k model

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856964408     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.006     Document Type: Article

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