Authority and communication in organizations

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 811-838

  Dessein, Wouter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; POWER RELATIONS;

EID: 0036773888     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00227     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Formal and real authority in organizations
2. Informal authority in organizations
3. A simple model of voice
4. Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk
5. Is there a discretion in wage setting? A test using takeover legislation
6. The firm as a communication network
7. Strategic information transmission
8. Collective decision-making and standing committees': An informationale rationale for restrictive amendment procedures
9. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration
10. Property rights and the nature of the firm
11. On the theory of delegation
12. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
13. Asymmetric information and legislative rules: Some amendments
14. A model of expertise
15. The simple economics of open source
16. Communication in settings with no transfers
17. The organization of decentralized information processing
18. Power in a theory of the firm
19. Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages
20. Pure communication between agents with close preferences
21. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand
22. Real-time decentralized information processing as a model of oganizations with boundedly rational agents
23. Delegation and the theory of the firm