Strategic delegation in experimental markets

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 561-574

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Müller, Wieland ^b   Normann, Hans Theo ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Inequality aversion; Managerial incentives; Oligopoly; Strategic delegation

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING; MANAGERS; PUBLIC POLICY; SALES; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; INEQUALITY AVERSION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; OLIGOPOLY; STRATEGIC DELEGATION;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 1842529098     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.10.005     Document Type: Article

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