Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory

Cognition

Volumn 158, Issue , 2017, Pages 90-109

  Bago, Bence ^a,b   De Neys, Wim ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DESCARTES   (France)

^b NORMANDIE UNIVERSITÉ   (France)

^c Administrateur de l Institut universitaire de France   (France)

Author keywords

Conflict detection; Dual process theory; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; FEMALE; HEURISTICS; HUMAN; INFORMATION PROCESSING; INTUITION; LATENT PERIOD; LOGIC; MALE; MENTAL PERFORMANCE; NORMAL HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROCESS MODEL; RESPONSE TIME; TASK PERFORMANCE; THINKING; TIME; TIME COURSE ASSUMPTION; CONFLICT; DECISION MAKING; MIDDLE AGED; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; TIME FACTOR;

ADULT; CONFLICT (PSYCHOLOGY); DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HEURISTICS; HUMANS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; TIME FACTORS;

EID: 84994461757     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014     Document Type: Article

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