In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 186-196

  Bonner, Carissa ^a   Newell, Ben R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONFLICT; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; SELF CONCEPT;

CONFLICT (PSYCHOLOGY); DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; SELF CONCEPT; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 77953932430     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/MC.38.2.186     Document Type: Article

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