Reasoning with base rates is routine, relatively effortless, and context dependent

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 528-534

  Pennycook, Gordon ^a   Thompson, Valerie A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

Author keywords

Base rate neglect; Conflict detection; Dual process theory; Probability estimates

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860846000     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-012-0249-3     Document Type: Article

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