Lax monitoring versus logical intuition: The determinants of confidence in conjunction fallacy

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 99-117

  Aczel, Balazs ^a   Szollosi, Aba ^a   Bago, Bence ^b  

^a EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

^b Administrateur de l Institut universitaire de France   (France)

Author keywords

Confidence; Conjunction fallacy; Logical Intuition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84948584585     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2015.1062801     Document Type: Article

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